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THE EUPHRATES-TIGRIS BASIN AND THE SOUTHEASTERN ANATOLIA PROJECT: IS ARMED CONFLICT IN THE OFFING?
We made from water every living thing.
-The Holy Koran (XXI, verse 30) Much has been written about scarce water resources in the arid Middle East, particularly concerning transboundary rivers and the friction that often arises as countries vie for their perceived sovereign rights of usage. Turkey, Syria and Iraq, the main riparians to the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, have unilaterally created agricultural irrigation schemes and other water utilization projects along these two rivers for centuries. Turkey is currently engaged in ambitious development of both rivers under a broad plan known as the Southeastern Anatolia Project or Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi (GAP). Syria and Iraq are highly dependent upon these two rivers for drinking water, irrigation, industrial uses, and hydroelectricity, and view this project with strong interest. Given the historic and complex religious, ethnic, territorial and hydro-political relationships between these three countries, Turkey's continuing development of the rivers is certain to increase tensions. This paper will examine the hypothesis that Turkey's Southeastern Anatolia Project will reduce water flow to the downstream riparians so drastically as to foment armed conflict in the basin region within the next ten years. Implications for U.S. national security strategy will also be discussed.
U.S. INTEREST
The United States has had a significant strategic interest in Turkey since World 
HYDRO-POLITICS
GEOGRAPHY
It is useful to develop an understanding of the geography of the Tigris and
Euphrates Rivers before discussing the details and characteristics of the GAP. Both rivers originate in the snow-rich mountains of Turkey, flow south through Syria and Iraq, and drain through the Shaft al-Arab waterway into the Persian Gulf (see Figure 1 ). The minimum recorded flow at Baghdad is 158 mcm/s, the mean is 1,236 mcm/s, and the maximum is 13,000 mcm/s. 19 Some experts have indicated that the two rivers combined produce an annual flow of 70-74 bcm/yr, with 32 bcm from the Euphrates and 42 bcm from the Tigris. 20 Others claim the total flow may exceed 80 bcm/yr, with 33 bcm and 47 bcm from the Euphrates and Tigris respectively. 21 Flow data, sources and uses of the two rivers can be found at Tables 1 and 2 . 24 The region of Turkey encompassing the GAP includes the six provinces of Adiyaman, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep, Mardin, Sanlifura or Urfa, and Siirt (see Figure 2) .
FIGURE 2. Turkey and Outline of the GAP Area
The Southeastern Anatolia Project is a huge undertaking for Turkey and is a matter of national pride. In addition to the irrigation and hydropower plans, all the related social and economic sectors including industry, transportation, mining, telecommunications, health, education, tourism, and infrastructure are expected to flourish. The high potential generated by the GAP, both in agriculture and industry, is expected to increase the income level of the people fivefold and generate employment opportunities for 3.8 million living in a region whose total population is projected to be over 9 million in 2005. 25 Lorenz and Erickson provide superb insight to the Turkish vision of the GAP as a symbol of hope for the future of the nation.
The development of the GAP has universal political appeal within Turkey and represents a source of great national pride -it is financed without the benefit of international financial organizations or the World Bank. This self-sufficiency has led to a heightened sense of national pride, a focus for the industrialization of the nation, significant influence in the region, and a great degree of independence of action and control over the project. The GAP is intended to bring industrialization and growth to a poor region of the country. It sends electricity to population centers and adds to the agricultural export base of Turkey. Not the least in importance, it provides hope for the large Kurdish minority in that area. There is something in this vision for almost every citizen of Turkey. 26 Planned distribution of work along each river includes 7 projects, 14 dams, and one million hectares of irrigated land along the Euphrates, 6 projects, 8 dams, and 700,000 hectares of irrigated land along the Tigris. 27 The Turkish government in Ankara expects the GAP to provide economic growth and stability to the Anatolia region, thereby drawing large numbers of its citizens from over-populated cities in western Turkey to the southeast for work and resettlement, along with a concurrent resolution to the Kurdish problem in the region. It should be noted, however, that economic and technical factors have slowed GAP progress and "though initially expected to be completed by 1994, the full project is now expected to take until the year 2030 or even 2040 to become operational."
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SCARCITY, SECURITY AND CONFLICT
Unquestionably, the GAP is a matter of monolithic importance to the government and citizens of Turkey and development can be expected to continue, albeit at a reduced pace, regardless of international or regional opinion. The issue at hand involves water flow along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers as it is affected by Turkey's continuing development of the GAP, and whether or not the impact will be a reduction in water flow of such magnitude that downstream riparians Syria and Iraq will employ forceful military action to restore the flow of water to pre-GAP levels. Naff has estimated that "when the Turkish projects are complete, the flow of the Euphrates River to Syria could be reduced by up to 40 percent, and to Iraq by up to 80 percent." 29 Compounding the issue is the manner in which Syria uses water, largely inefficient and wasteful in nature, a fact that does not escape the view of Turkey and Iraq. 30 In the Middle East as a whole, the population is expected to double over the next 25 years, and within the Tigris-Euphrates basin in particular, "population growth and projected demands on the rivers will eventually exceed capacity." 31 Thus, when assessing the potential for conflict, a determination of scarcity and the resulting influence on security is critical to the overall analysis. Beginning with scarcity, need is the basic foundation, as "at the most basic level, actual scarcity may be said to exist when real demand (i.e., need) exceeds real supply." 32 There are six basic causes for water scarcity and they include "climate variations (principally drought);
degradation of water quality by human activity at a rate faster than the source can be 8 renewed; depletion of a source, such as an aquifer, at a rate faster than it can be replenished; out-of-basin diversion or storage of surface water; redistribution for other uses or to another place; and consumption." 33 When a nation perceives its water supply as scarce for any reason, a climate of uncertainty and instability develops, leading nations to view access to water as a matter of national security. Inextricably then tied to scarcity is security, the definition of which at the most basic level includes "being secure from harm or annihilation" and with regard to water, security of the nation-state is the common context under which this definition is understood. 34 So, dp the actions of the upstream riparian, assuming these actions negatively impact the availability of water and consequently the security of the downstream riparian, necessarily evoke armed conflict?
The response cannot be satisfied with a simple yes or no answer. The nature of security is complex and "a resource issue like water scarcity is a constant underlying security factor that could act as a trigger for conflict; but precisely how and why it would trigger warfare rather than another reaction is not clearly known, as water could in the same circumstances act as a catalyst for negotiations. Conflict is a highly complex matter and where conflict over water is concerned, there are always causal links to other factors such as politics, economics, religion, or ethnicity. 37 Therefore, potentiality for armed conflict over Turkey's GAP plan must be examined under further concepts.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Given the long history and complexity of hydro-political conflict in the Tigris- the Hatay Province and the GAP. 43 Turkey has developed stronger ties with Israel, signing a military training and education agreement in 1996 and publicly claiming to share the same strategic threat. 44 Turkish national military strategy has also changed in that it now considers forward engagement appropriate and "will seek to meet threats to Turkey beyond its sovereign territories.'' 45 Turkey holds a decisive military advantage over both Syria and Iraq, and although Iraq has been rebuilding its forces since its defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, Turkey is the hegemonic power in the region. When applied to the predictability of conflict or cooperation over shared water resources, asymmetric power is a determining factor in that the riparian with the greater power has greater ability to control the situation, an aspect of conflict that will be explored in the following section.
THE POWER MATRIX
A matrix utilizing three criteria has been developed by Naff (adapted from Frey, 1993) as a means of helping to predict conflict or cooperation in shared water resources. 46 The three criteria include 1) need for water, and this "reflects the motivations and perceptions of riparian actors and directs them toward cooperation or strife", 2) riparian position, which regards the upstream riparian position as most advantageous, and 3) projection of power, the most important factor. 47 Each factor is evaluated on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest power value, with the exception of military power, which is rated on a scale of 1 to 10. The three factors are combined and the highest total in each basin is indicative of the individual riparians relative strength. The following three propositions are then considered when evaluating the potential for water-based conflict:
The greatest potential for conflict exists when a lower riparian is a more powerful actor than the upper water-controlling riparian and perceives its need to be deliberately frustrated.
When an uppermost riparian is the most powerful actor in an international basin, that disparity (or asymmetry) of power inhibits conflict potential. When relative power symmetry coexists in a basin with asymmetry in interest and position, there will be a moderate but consistent potential for conflict. With a matrix score of 18 Turkey is established as holding the relative power position over Syria and Iraq. Further, Turkey is the hegemonic power in the region.
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Thus, as the upstream riparian and factoring the second proposition as seen above, one concludes the potential for conflict in the region to be low.
ARMED CONFLICT OR COOPERATION
The possibility of Turkey substantially diminishing the flow of water in both the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers via the Southeastern Anatolia Project and, as a result, fomenting armed conflict in the basin region within the next ten years, is highly unlikely in view of the above. Diminished water availability is a distinct reality for a number of reasons including significant population growth, but the GAP should not reduce water flow so significantly as to incite war. On the contrary, the GAP has actually been beneficial to the downstream riparians for Although Turkey was motivated by its own interests, the construction of huge storage dams in the country has had a positive effect on Turkey's downstream neighbours. For instance, during the 1988-9 water year, which was the driest of the last 50 years, the deficiency in the natural flow was compensated by water from the Keban and Karakaya reservoirs protecting Syria and Iraq from the dire consequences of the drought. Similarly, in the years of plenty, these reservoirs regulate the flow and protect the downstream countries from destructive floods. This is what Iraq was trying to achieve in 1946, and was ready to pay for, when it signed the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations with Turkey.
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It is also highly improbable that any type of alliance or partnership will form between Syria and Iraq, thereby eliminating any possibility of a combined military force to combat the NATO allied Turkish army. Intense political and ethnic tensions will likely continue, but a growing need for cooperation over water resources will obviate any propensity toward armed conflict over water resources alone. According to Naff "all the key actors, at least in the Jordan Basin and very probably in the Euphrates and Nile basins as well, finally appear to be serious about preferring negotiation to conflict." 1960s. This progressive process has made the riparian states more creative, and by opening up the possibilities for more understanding, it has contributed to a higher state of cooperation among them." 53 Waterbury indicates that regardless of "how acute the crises that may emerge in the coming years over water supply in the Middle East, armed conflict is not likely to be an outcome." 54 Cooperation, rather than armed conflict, appears to be in the offing.
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
The U.S. maintains a steadfast strategic interest in the Middle East. Our current national security strategy clearly stipulates that the U.S. "has enduring interests in pursuing a just, lasting and comprehensive Middle East peace, ensuring the security and well-being of Israel, helping our Arab friends provide for their security, and maintaining the free flow of oil." 55 Seventy percent of the world's oil is found in the Middle East, therefore, of paramount interest to the U.S. is assurance of an unhindered flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the world market. This concern is followed closely by a number of other significant U.S. strategic interests in the region including the need for inhibiting 58 The U.S. should then, in the near term, consider a more actively involved approach toward efforts designed to promote greater water use efficiency and enhance transboundary water cooperation between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, recommendations for which are provided in the following section.
RECOMMENDATIONS
There are numerous courses of action to be considered for conflict resolution and/or prevention in the Tigris-Euphrates basin. Diplomacy is always paramount and the U.S. State Department should remain active, offering assistance when and where possible in helping to shape regional stability. As discussed earlier in this paper, the issue of reliable data is a point of contention between the three main riparians, yet critical to forming a basis for cooperative agreement. Since most discussions over shared water occur at the leadership level of each county, with politics and power impeding the dialogue, cooperation could be approached instead in a joint institutional manner, among scientists and water experts who would form an alliance for data compilation based on mutual concern for the people of the region. Unburdened by political or ethnic concerns a "central information bureau under the international auspices would be a helpful first step in stimulating cooperation." 59 The U.S. could assist through technology by providing information on rates of water flow and usage, as well as by offering solutions for greater efficiency in irrigation methods. 60 Democracy, use of the term democracy in connection with the Turkish governing authority is a misnomer. 62 Turkey maintains a stable, secular government, though one in which the military effectively acts as a watchdog, making sure that the principles of Ataturkism. are upheld. In particular, the secular military insists on regimes that will continue with western alliances and modernization, and has staged coups when too great an Islamic influence has entered the political arena. It is a fact that contrary to Western-style democracy, the military actually plays a permanent role in Turkish politics.
Therefore, Turkey should not be considered a democracy in its truest sense, i.e. a civilian dominated government, by and for the people with majority rule, but rather it should be understood that Turkish military leaders will maintain an influential position from which they can shape the country's political direction. U.S. strategists must recognize that these circumstances will form the backdrop in any negotiations process. 
